WW II North Africa 1942 French Marshal Pierre Koenig medal 70mm,212gr bronze

Description

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Marie Joseph Pierre François Kœnig
(
French pronunciation: ​
[maʁi pjɛʁ køniɡ]
; 10 October 1898 – 2 September 1970) was a
French
general during the
Second World War
, where he commanded a
Free French
Brigade at the
Battle of Bir Hakeim
in North Africa in 1942. He started a political career after the War and was posthumously elevated to the dignity of
Marshal of France
in 1984.
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Battle of Bir Hakeim
Part of the
Battle of Gazala
during the
Second World War
Free French Foreign Legionnaires assaulting an enemy strong point at Bir Hakeim
Date
26 May – 11 June 1942
Location
Bir Hakeim
,
Libya
Result
See
Aftermath
Belligerents
Free French Forces
United Kingdom
British Raj
Germany
Italy
Commanders and leaders
Marie-Pierre Kœnig
Erwin Rommel
Strength
3,703 men
37,000 Axis troops
Casualties and losses
141 killed
229 wounded
814 captured
53 guns
50 vehicles
110 aircraft
3,300 killed or wounded
227–845 captured
164 vehicles
49 aircraft
Bir Hakeim was attacked by the
Ariete
Division, then by mixed force of the
Trieste
and 90th Light divisions
show
v
t
e
Free French campaigns
show
v
t
e
Western Desert Campaign
The
Battle of Bir Hakeim
(
Arabic pronunciation:
[biʔr ħaˈkiːm]
) took place at
Bir Hakeim
, an oasis in the Libyan desert south and west of Tobruk, during the
Battle of Gazala
(26 May – 21 June 1942). The
1st Free French Brigade
(
Général de brigade
Marie-Pierre Kœnig
) defended the position from
26 May – 11 June
against much larger Axis forces of
Panzerarmee Afrika
(
Generaloberst
Erwin Rommel
). The
Panzerarmee
captured
Tobruk
ten days later but the delay imposed on the Axis offensive by the defence of the fortress influenced the cancellation of
Operation Herkules
, the plan for an Axis invasion of
Malta
. Rommel continued to advance and invaded Egypt, slowed by British delaying actions until the
First Battle of El Alamein
in July, where the Axis advance was stopped. Both sides used the battle for propaganda, Winston Churchill renamed the
Free French
as the Fighting French and Hitler called the French the second best fighters after the Germans.
Contents
1
Background
2
Prelude
3
Siege
4
Aftermath
5
Order of battle
6
See also
7
Citations
8
References
9
Further reading
10
External links
Background
Eighth Army
At the beginning of 1942, after its defeat in western
Cyrenaica
during
Unternehmen Theseus
, the
Eighth Army
(Lieutenant-General
Neil Ritchie
) faced the Axis troops in
Libya
roughly 48 kilometres (30 mi) west of the port of
Tobruk
, along a line running from the coast at Gazala, southwards for about 48 kilometres (30 mi). Both sides accumulated supplies for an offensive to forestall their opponent and General
Claude Auchinleck
, Commander in Chief of
Middle East Command
, hoped for the Eighth Army to be ready by May. British code-breakers tracked the dispatch of convoys to Libya as the British anti-shipping offensive from Malta was neutralised by Axis bombing and forecast that the Axis would attack first.
[1]
As the Eighth Army was not ready to take the offensive, Ritchie planned to fight a defensive battle on the Gazala line.
[2]
Auchinleck's appreciation of the situation to Ritchie in mid-May anticipated either a frontal attack in the centre of the Gazala line followed by an advance on Tobruk or a flanking move to the south, looping around the Gazala line towards Tobruk.
[3]
Auchinleck saw the former as more likely (with a feint on the flank to draw away the Eighth Army tanks) while Ritchie favoured the latter. Auchinleck suggested that British armour be concentrated near El Adem, where it would be well placed to meet either threat.
[3]
Since
Operation Crusader
in late 1941, the Eighth Army had received
M3 Grant
tanks with a
37mm gun
in a turret and a
75mm gun
in a hull
sponson
, which could penetrate the armour of the
Panzer III
Ausf. H
and
J
and the
Panzer IV
at 600–800 m (650–850 yd). The frontal armour of the Grant was thick enough to withstand the
50 mm Pak 38
anti-tank gun at 900 m (1,000 yd) and the short-barrelled
50 mm KwK 38
gun carried by the
Panzer
III at 250 m (250 yd). The first
112 ×
6-pounder
anti-tank guns had arrived and been allotted to the motor brigades of the armoured divisions.
[4]
Panzerarmee Afrika
Italian
Semovente 75/18
, 1942
At the meeting of Axis leaders at
Berchtesgaden
on 1 May, it was agreed that Rommel should attack at the end of the month to capture Tobruk. The
Panzerarmee
was to pause at the Egyptian border, while the Axis captured Malta in
Operation Herkules
and then Rommel was to invade Egypt.
[5]
The
Panzerarmee
had finished converting to the up-armoured
Panzer III Ausf. H
and had
received nineteen
Panzer III Ausf. J
(Mark III Specials), with long-barrelled
50 mm KwK 39
guns. Four
Panzer IV Ausf. G
(Mark IV Specials) with long-barrelled
7.5 cm KwK 40
guns had also arrived.
[6]
The
Abwehr
(German military intelligence) had
broken
some British military codes and in late 1941 penetrated
Black
, the code used by
Bonner Fellers
, a US military attaché. The British divulged much tactical information to Fellers, who unwittingly reported it to the Axis as well as Washington.
[7]
Air attacks by the
Luftwaffe
and
Regia Aeronautica
on Malta reduced its offensive capacity and supply convoys from Italy reached the Axis forces in Africa with fewer losses.
[8]
Until May, Axis monthly deliveries to Libya averaged 60,963 tonnes (60,000 long tons), fewer than a smaller Axis force received from June–October 1941 but sufficient for an offensive. The 1,400 km (900 mi) advance to Gazala succeeded because the port of Benghazi was open, reducing the transport distance for about
33 percent
of the supplies of the
Panzerarmee
to 450 km (280 mi). The capture of Malta would not alter the constraints of port capacity and distance; protecting convoys and the use of a large port close to the front would still be necessary.
[9]
Map of the Gazala line and Operation Venice, May–June, 1942
Unternehmen Venezia
(Operation Venice), the Axis plan of attack, was for tanks to make a flanking advance around the Bir Hakeim box at the southern extremity of the Gazala line. On the left side of the manoeuvre, the Italian
132nd Armoured Division
Ariete
would neutralise the Bir Hakeim box. Further south, the
21st Panzer Division
and
15th Panzer Division
would advance through the desert further south, moving east, then turning north behind the Gazala line to destroy the British armour and cut off the infantry divisions in the line. The most southerly part of the attacking formation, a
kampfgruppe
(battle group) of the
90th
Leichtes Afrika
Division
(
Generalmajor
Ulrich Kleemann
) was to advance to El Adem south of Tobruk, cut the supply routes from the port to the Gazala line and hold British troops at Tobruk by a ruse; aircraft-engines mounted on trucks were to raise dust, simulating a big armoured force.
[8]
The rest of the Italian
XX Motorised Corps
, the
101st Motorized Division
Trieste
, would open a gap in the minefield north of Bir Hakeim, near the Sidi Muftah box, to create a supply route to the panzers. Rommel anticipated that having dealt with the British tanks, he would have captured El Adem, Ed Duda and
Sidi Rezegh
by nightfall and later the
Knightsbridge
defensive box, about 40 km (25 mi) north-east of Bir Hakeim. The Axis tanks would be in a position next day to thrust westwards against the Eighth Army defensive boxes between Gazala and Alem Hamza, meeting the eastwards attack by the Italian X and XXI corps. By late May, the Axis forces comprised
90,000 men,
560 tanks
and
542 aircraft.
[10]
P